Parshas Shemini - Parsha Stumpers

פרשת שמיני

Parsha Stumpers and Something to Think About

1. Rashi (Vayikra 9:1) on the first passuk in this week's parsha comments that Hashem had Moshe call over the elders of B'nei Yisorel to let them know that it was according to Hashem's command that Aharon be the one to assume the position of Kohen Gadol, so that they should not say that Aharon took the position by himself. Was this really a worry? The Kohen Gadol had a very scary job going into the Kodesh HaK'doshim on Yom Kippur. Why would anyone assume this position unless told by Hashem to do so? Why would the elders of Yisroel allow such a possibility to enter their mind?

2. Rashi (Vayikra 9:2) writes that Hashem commanded Aharon to take a calf as a karbon in order to grant an atonement for partaking in the cheit Ha'Eigel (sin of the golden calf). How could this be a proper atonement for Aharon if we know that there is a principle of ein k'teiger na'aseh sneiger (that one does not get the prosecutor to be the defendant)?

3. Rashi (Vayikra 10:2) offers two explanation as to why Nadav and Avihu received such strict punishment. The second explanation he gives is that really the Torah had never warned the Kohanim yet not to do the avodah after drinking wine. Nonetheless, Hashem used this opportunity as a means of example for future kohanim. However, if the kohanim were never warned at this point yet that doing so was a problem, why is it that Nadav and Avihu were punished for it?

4. Rashi (Vayikra 10:16) comments that after the episode with Aharon and his remaining two sons eating a karbon improperly (at least according to Moshe's understanding), Moshe turned and displayed anger towards Aharon's sons (Elazar and Isammar). Rashi writes that the reason for this was to spare Aharon's dignity. Since when does Moshe save someone's dignity by not telling them they did something wrong? Moshe should have displayed anger towards Aharon as well in order to show that what he does was wrong!?

5. After Aharon explained their reasoning that eating from that particular karbon was the right thing to do, despite the fact that he was an onein (because Nadav and Avihu had just died), the Passuk (Vayikra 10:20) says that Moshe heard and he approved. Rashi on this passuk comments that Moshe admitted Aharon was right and that he was not embarrassed to say that he had not heard that particular halacha (law). How could it be, though, that Moshe had not heard of a halacha ?

6. How is it possible to get fleishig milk?

7. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 17a) says that in order to be appointed as a member of the Sanhedrin, one must know how to deem a sheretz – tahor. What is the point of this if the Torah specifically states that it is tamei ? And what is a way to arrive at the (mistaken) conclusion that a sheretz should be tahor?

Parshas Vayikra - Parsha Stumpers

פרשת ויקרא

Parsha Stumpers and Something to Think About

1. (1:1) The Baal Haturim writes that the small aleph in “Vayikra” was a compromise between Moshe and Hashem. Moshe only wanted the Torah to say “Vayakar” to express that Hashem only happened to appear to Moshe as the Torah expresses when Hashem went to Billam. So, the compromise was to have the aleph but in smaller font. The question is though: Granted Moshe was the humblest man who ever lived, however, humility does not mean sinking to a low-life level of Billam. The middah of anavah sometimes requires one to utilize his full self esteem and specifically do things to show that he represents the will of Hashem. So, how could Moshe suggest that The Torah recall his encounters with Hashem in the same way it does for Billam?
2. Besides for iin this week's parsha by Hashem talking to Moshe by the Ohel Moed, there are two other times in the Torah when Hashem “calls” Moshe before speaking to him. When were they?
3. (1:2) The passuk says, “When a person from among you will bring a karbon...” Rashi comments that the Torah uses the word “Adam” to teach us that just as Adam, the first man, did not bring any offering from that which was stolen since everything was his, so too any person must never bring an offering of a stolen animal. Why would the Torah go out of its way to give such a dramatic example? The idea of not being allowed to bring a stolen animal is one that is already taught in the passuk, and the concept of mitzva ha'ba'ah b'aveira (not being allowed to do a mitzva brought about through a means of doing an aveirah) is already known. So why is this extreme example also necessary?
4. There is a concept in this weeks parsha (Rashi 1:3) as well as many times throughout the Gemara that we sometimes force people to do things against their will until they say “okay, I'll do it”. At that point it is actually considered as if it is indeed their will. How could that be if they were forced to say it?
5. Where is there a hint in the parsha to the concept that an idea becomes a reality and “created” in a sense only when a person speaks out the idea verbally?
6. Why does Rashi repeat multiple times regarding karbon chatas (sin offering) that it must be brought with the intent for the sake of being a sin-offering?