Parshas Bechukosai - Parsha Stumpers

~ Something to Think About ~

בחקותי פרשת 

Parsha Stumpers

By: Daniel Listhaus

1. If the highest level of avodas Hashem is doing mitzvos lishmah, then why is it that in this pasha the Torah tells us that if “bechukosai teileichu”…then Hashem will give rain…?
2. Once the Torah did in fact choose to describe the rewards of those who walk in the way of Hashem, why choose the “minor leagues” of the rewards of this world as opposed to the major league rewards of Olam Haba’ah?

Parshas Kedoshim - Parsha Stumpers

~ Something to Think About ~

פרשת קדושים

Parsha Stumpers

By: Daniel Listhaus

1. What does it mean to be kedoshim? The Gemara in kiddushin describes that the rabbanan termed the hebrew word for engagement as “Kiddushin” because essentially by marrying a wife you are making her “assur to everyone else just like hekdesh”. What is the root of what it means to be a kadosh?

2. Parshas Kedoshim contains many mitzvos – within these the eseres hadibros are present. Some of them are straight out and some of them are alluded to. Where?

3. The passuk (19:17) says tjhat there is a mitzva to give others mussar...'and you should not bear a sin because of him'. What does this mean?

4. Why is 'v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha' a 'zeh k'lal gadol ba'Torah?

5. The passuk (20:3), when describing prohibition of giving children over to molech (a certain form of avodah zarrah), says that Hashem will direct his face upon them and cut them off from their people. Rashi explains further that Hashem will turn aside, so to speak, from all his other concerns to deal with this person...

        a. Why does the Torah use this expression here more than other times in           chumash?

        b. The passuk in Acharei Mos 17:10 uses the same expression regarding eating   blood and Rashi explains it the same way? What is the connection?

6. Rashi (19:4) comes to explain that not only is one forbidden to make his own idols, one is also forbidden to worship the idols that someone else gives him. What is Rashi adding? If I can't make my own idols then why would I think someone else could give me idols and that would be fine for me to worship? Furthermore, our parsha contains two concepts which would counter such a mistake anyway: that of lifnei iver and divrei harav v'divrei hatalmud l'divrei mi shomim (see rashi by kibud av v'eim)?

7. A similar question as the one above could also be asked regarding molech. Rashi (20:3) comments that one might think that even though one cannot offer his child to molech avodah zarah, but perhaps one would think it is permitted to give over a  grandchild. Why would someone make such a drastic mistake to think that? Would someone really think that although one cannot sacrifice a child for avodah zarrah that it would be permitted to sacrifice a grandchild?

8. The passuk (19:14) says that one may not curse a deaf person. Rashi is bothered why the passuk limits this to only cursing deaf people and goes on to say that there is a different source to teach us not to curse anyone (based on shemos 22:27). Why isn't this a kal v'chomeir, though? After all, if one is not allowed to curse someone who cannot hear them, then certainly if that person could hear you which would cause even more conflict and strife?

9. The passuk (19:15) commands us to judge our friends favorably, yet there is another concept of v'hiyisem n'kiyim – that each individual has the responsibility to be “clean” in the eyes if his peers. Where does the line get drawn between these two ideas? Also, how far, in general, must one go when it comes to being dan l'kaf zechus?

10. The passuk  (19:26) states the issur of practicing divination and believing in “lucky times”. Where does the line get drawn between not making up superstitions versus listening to the messages that Hashem is trying to communicate to us?

11. Rashi (19:32) describes that displaying honor to an elder is accomplished by not sitting in his place, not speaking in his place, and not contradicting him. Interestingly, these were the same examples Rashi (19:3) used regarding acting towards one parents – but there Rashi gave them as the examples of fear of ones parents as opposed to the other examples chosen to illustrate honor to one's parents. Why the difference?

Parshas Acharei Mos - Parsha Stumpers

~ Something to Think About ~

 אחרי-מות פרשת 

Parsha Stumpers

By: Daniel Listhaus

1. Rashi 16:1 – Why necessary to spook Aharon out here by this mitzva more than anyone else by any other? And why Aharon more than anyone else? He understood right away with “va'yidom aharon ” that his children deserved to die?

2. Rashi 16:5 – Why would merely changing the clothes require tevilas yadayim v'raglaim?

3. 16:8 – Why were the two goats chosen via lottery arbitrarily to decide which one was la'hashem and which la'a'za'zel?

4. 17:10 The passuk (17:10) when describing prohibition of eating blood says that anyone who eats blood – Hashem will direct his face upon them and cut them off from their people. Rashi explains further that Hashem will turn aside, so to speak, from all his other concerns to deal with this person. What is so bad about eating blood that the Torah takes so seriously? (Extra Credit: Where else in the Torah does the Torah use the same expression and Rashi explain the same way? What is the connection?)

5. The Gemara in Yoma says that the picking of which goat was “for Hashem” and which was to go “to Azazel” was determined solely by the lot they had. Rashi in Parshas Kedoshim, though, explains the issur of “lo sinachshu” and “lo s'oneinu” (not to practice divination; and not to believe in luck) as viewing arbitrary events as meaningful omens. If one is not supposed to believe in luck or arbitrary outcomes, why is it that we use a lottery to determine which goat should be used on Yom Kippur as an offering to Hashem and which should go to its death in Azazel?

Parshas Metzora - Parsha Stumpers

~ Something to Think About ~

 מצורעפרשת   

Parsha Stumpers

By: Daniel Listhaus

1. Where is there an acronym for Motzee Shem Ra in this week's parsha?

2. (14:4) The Rambam writes (Mishna Torah and Shemoneh Perakim) that one who has failed in a particular middah and now wants to work on fixing it, should first balance it out by going to the other extreme. So, for example, one who had become a big ba’al gaivah and want to now work on suppressing his ego and becoming more humble, he should do things on the opposite extreme of what he had been doing until he is able to find the proper balance in the middle. If so, granted the hyssop is very necessary as part of the metzora’s tahara as Rashi explains, but why the cedarwood? Shouldn’t that specically be left out?

3. Rabbah bar bar Shila says on Daf Beis amud beis in Berachos that if in the passuk of “u'va ha'shemesh v'taheir”, u'va hashemesh=beeas ohro and v'taheir=tahor gavra; then the passuk should have used the word “vayitaheir” to illustrate the active requirement to become tahor instead of the word “tahor” which is a more passive sounding word (even without a kaparah).....Ask a question on this from this week's parsha.

4. (14:34) Why is tzara’as also Hashem’s method of letting people know when there are treasures behind the wall of a house?

Parshas Tazria - Parsha Stumpers

~ Something to Think About ~

תזריעפרשת 

Parsha Stumpers

By: Daniel Listhaus

1. (12:3) ”Rashi writes that just like man was created after animals, so too were the halachos of birth commanded after halachos of animals (kashrus).” Indeed sometimes the Torah instructs us that the proper order of teaching and responding is A-B A-B: That when two things are said the proper approach is to respond in the same order (See also when Eliezer responded to Lavan/Besuel). However there are also examples where the Torah orders in a A-B B-A format justifying that since the last thing taught is still fresh on the mind we respond to that first. (See Gemara Berachos 2a and Tosfos Bava Kamma 17a). What are the guidelines when to respond in the order of things mentioned and when to respond to the second item first?

2. (13:14) Rashi writes that when a person thinks he has tzara’as he must go to the kohen have it inspected. However, there are two exceptions: A chossen (during sheva berachos) and any person on a Yom Tov. How could we understand this? Why would the Torah push aside a pressing matter for personal happiness? Clearly the person deserves the tzara’as so why consider the fact that the afflicted will suffer on his “personal days”? It’s his own fault!

3. Tzara’as is a physical effect of something non-physical (harmful speech). The truth is that all speech creates realities. Where is that hinted to in the Hebrew word for “speech” and where do we hint to this idea in davening? 

Parshas Shemini - Parsha Stumpers

~ Something to Think About ~

שמיני פרשת  

Parsha Stumpers

By: Daniel Listhaus

1. Rashi (Vayikra 9:1) on the first passuk in this week's parsha comments that Hashem had Moshe call over the elders of B'nei Yisorel to let them know that it was according to Hashem's command that Aharon be the one to assume the position of Kohen Gadol, so that they should not say that Aharon took the position by himself. Was this really a worry? The Kohen Gadol had a very scary job going into the Kodesh HaK'doshim on Yom Kippur. Why would anyone assume this position unless told by Hashem to do so? Why would the elders of Yisroel allow such a possibility to enter their mind?

2. Rashi (Vayikra 9:2) writes that Hashem commanded Aharon to take a calf as a karbon in  order to grant an atonement for partaking in the cheit Ha'Eigel (sin of the golden calf). How could this be a proper atonement for Aharon if we know that there is a principle of ein k'teiger na'aseh sneiger (that one does not get the prosecutor to be the defendant)?

3. Rashi (Vayikra 10:2) offers two explanations as to why Nadav and Avihu received such strict punishment. The second explanation he gives is that really the Torah had never warned the Kohanim yet not to do the avodah after drinking wine. Nonetheless, Hashem used this opportunity as a means of example for future kohanim. However, if the kohanim were never warned at this point yet that doing so was a problem, why is it that Nadav and Avihu were punished for it? 

4. Rashi (Vayikra 10:16) comments that after the episode with Aharon and his remaining two sons eating a karbon improperly (at least according to Moshe's understanding), Moshe turned and displayed anger towards Aharon's sons (Elazar and Isammar). Rashi writes that the reason for this was to spare Aharon's dignity. Since when does Moshe save someone's dignity by not telling them they did something wrong? Moshe should have displayed anger towards Aharon as well in order to show that what he does was wrong!?

5. After Aharon explained their reasoning that eating from that particular karbon was the right thing to do, despite the fact that he was an onein (because Nadav and Avihu had just died), the Passuk (Vayikra 10:20) says that Moshe heard and he approved. Rashi on this passuk comments that Moshe admitted Aharon was right and that he was not embarrassed to say that he had not heard that particular halacha (law).

a.    How could it be, though, that Moshe had not heard of a halacha ?

b.    How could Aharon have made a halachik decision without Moshe? Wasn’t that precisely what Nadav and Avihu had done wrong (according to some opinions) which caused them to be killed?

6. How is it possible to get fleishig  milk?

7. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 17a) says that in order to be appointed as a member of the Sanhedrin, one must know how to deem a sheretz – tahor. What is the point of this if the Torah specifically states that it is tamei ? And what is a way to arrive at the (mistaken) conclusion that a sheretz should be tahor?

8. Where in the Parsha do we see the inyan that it is not respectful to grow one’s hair long or walk around with ripped clothing? (Bonus: Where do we see this concept in Megillas Esther as well?).

9. The midpoint of the Torah, in terms of words, is in this week’s parsha. Where is it and what is special about it?

10. How do you reconcile the concept of ivdu es Hashem b’simcha with the negative commandment against drinking wine before doing the ultimate for of avodas  in the beis Ha’mikdash?

11. What do the simanim regarding kosher animals represent – both by fish and land animals? What lesson could be learned from “vayidom Aharon”?

12. What is the deal with pig?

1.     What is so tricky about pigs?

2.      Which nation is compared to a pig? Why?

3.      Why are pigs called chazir? And which passuk in Ovadiah do we say multiple times a day which alludes to this idea?

Parshas Vayikra - Parsha Stumpers

~ Something to Think About ~

פרשת ויקרא

Parsha Stumpers

By: Daniel Listhaus

1. (1:1) The Baal Haturim writes that the small aleph in “Vayikra” was a compromise between Moshe and Hashem. Moshe only wanted the Torah to say “Vayakar” to express that Hashem only happened to appear to Moshe as the Torah expresses when Hashem went to Billam. So, the compromise was to have the aleph but in smaller font. The question is though: Granted Moshe was the humblest man who ever lived, however, humility does not mean sinking to a low-life level of Billam. The middah of anavah sometimes requires one to utilize his full self esteem and specifically do things to show that he represents the will of Hashem. So, how could Moshe suggest that The Torah recall his encounters with Hashem in the same way it does for Billam?

2. Besides for in this week's parsha by Hashem talking to Moshe by the Ohel Moed, there are two other times in the Torah when Hashem “calls” Moshe before speaking to him. When were they?

3. (1:2) The passuk says, “When a person from among you will bring a karbon...” Rashi comments that the Torah uses the word “Adam” to teach us that just as Adam, the first man, did not bring any offering from that which was stolen since everything was his, so too any person must never bring an offering of a stolen animal. Why would the Torah go out of its way to give such a dramatic example? The idea of not being allowed to bring a stolen animal is one that is already taught in the passuk, and the concept of mitzva ha'ba'ah b'aveira (not being allowed to do a mitzva brought about through a means of doing an aveirah) is already known. So why is this extreme example also necessary?

4. There is a concept in this week’s parsha (Rashi 1:3) as well as many times throughout the Gemara that we sometimes force people to do things against their will until they say “okay, I'll do it”. At that point it is actually considered as if it is indeed their will. How could that be if they were forced to say it?

5. Where is there a hint in the parsha to the concept that an idea becomes a reality and “created” in a sense only when a person speaks out the idea verbally?

6. Why does Rashi repeat multiple times regarding karbon chatas (sin offering) that it must be brought with the intent for the sake of being a sin-offering?